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THE TROUBLE WITH SHADOW GOVERNMENT
Howard M. Wasserman*
Presidential succession and government continuity suddenly is a hot topic.
The September 11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent War Against Terrorism
have brought to the fore the possibility of a catastrophic terrorist attack,
perhaps involving small concealed nuclear devices, laying waste to all of
Washington, D.C., killing the president and vice president, and destroying
Congress and the federal government. This prospect in turn raises procedural
questions about how to preserve the federal government, particularly the
executive branch, and how to maintain governance in the federal system. The
central concerns must be who will succeed to the presidency and assume the
executive power under the Constitution and how to repopulate the political
branches and departments in the federal government.
It initially was feared that intended targets of the coordinated September 11
attacks included Congress, President Bush traveling aboard Air Force One, and
Vice President Cheney at the White House. None of these aspects of the
attacks succeeded, but they raise the specter of a successful terrorist attack
creating a double vacancy in the presidency and vice presidency, and
triggering the presidential succession statute. Much of the activity on the
morning of September 11 was geared to ensuring the immediate safety of the
President, Vice President, and members of the cabinet in a secure location,
with the intent of maintaining some executive branch officer at the head of the
federal government.
* Assistant Professor, Florida International University College of Law. J.D. (1997); B.S. (1990),
Northwestern University. Thanks to Jim Chen, Steven Gey, John Harrison, and B.J. Priester for their thoughts,
comments, and suggestions. This Article was presented to the faculties at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law
and Florida International University College of Law.
1 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 ("Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death,
Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as
President. ... ); 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2000); William F. Brown & Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Realities of
Presidential Succession: "The Emperor Has No Clones," 75 GEO. L.J. 1389, 1431-35 (1987); Howard M.
Wasserman, Structural Principles and Presidential Succession, 90 KY. L.J. 345, 354-56 (2002).
2 See Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast, Sept. 16, 2001) (interviewing Vice President Richard
Cheney).
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On one hand, concerns about an even more catastrophic, nuclear-based
terrorist attack destroying the federal government appear overstated. It is not
clear that a terrorist attack is any more likely to succeed in taking out the top
tier of the federal government and leaving it headless than a Soviet nuclear
strike during the Cold War. Indeed, it arguably would have been easier to
destroy the entire federal structure (and the entire nation) through one grand-
scale nuclear First Strike than through a series of finely coordinated
simultaneous individual attacks or with several briefcases containing small
nuclear devices. This perhaps means that the extant statutory succession
procedures, which have been in place since 1947 and which functioned
reasonably well throughout the Cold War,3 remain sufficient. For example,
common practice has been for one cabinet officer to remain outside
Washington when the president addresses a Joint Session of Congress attended
by members of the cabinet; this practice guarantees that, in the event of an
attack directed at Congress when most members of the legislative and
executive branches are present, one officer would remain to assume control of
the executive branch.4
On the other hand, terrorist suicide bombers wielding nuclear devices
benefit from some element of surprise. There would be no advance warning of
such an attack, as there would have been with a Soviet missile launch, meaning
less (or no) opportunity to move the president and those in the line of
succession to safety. The surprise perhaps makes this attack better able to
decapitate the federal government. Thus, while we must consider some
ghoulish and morbid scenarios straight out of Independence Day5 or Mars
Attacks,6 the issue of how to maintain or replace federal officials and how
properly to continue operations of the federal government has become a
genuine topic of concern.
3 The most vivid double vacancy moment in that time came in March 1981, following the assassination
attempt on President Ronald Reagan, when Secretary of State Alexander Haig announced at a White House
press briefing that he was "in control, here in the White House," despite the fact that the Vice President,
Speaker of the House, and President Pro Tempore of the Senate-all ahead of Haig in the line of succession-
were alive and able to assume the presidency. See Richard V. Allen, The Day Reagan Was Shot, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Apr. 2001, at 64, 66; Wasserman, supra note 1, at 345.
4 When President Bush addressed a joint session of Congress two months after September 11, the officer
absent from the address was Vice President Cheney.
5 INDEPENDENCE DAY (20th Century Fox 1996) (depicting an alien spaceship hovering over the White
House and blowing it apart with a laser weapon).
6 MARS ATTACKS! (Warner Bros. 1996) (depicting Martian leader addressing a joint session of Congress
on national television and killing off the entire gallery with a laser, then killing the President during a meeting
in a bunker). At the end of the film, after the Martians have been defeated, the President's teenage daughter
becomes the leader of the country. Id.
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The succession policy focuses have been manifold. First, there have been
proposals to amend the double vacancy succession statute by changing the
order of succession and by extending the succession order to include all of
Congress, sub-cabinet-level executive officers, and, most significantly, state
governors. Second, there has been a focus on ensuring the continuation of the
federal government and its operations. The most notorious of these proposals
is the Bush Administration's "shadow government," details of which are not
widely known and have not been shared either with the public or with
Congress. The plans appear to involve officers from every executive
department and agency, secured in an unknown location, prepared to emerge
and assume control following an attack, perhaps with Vice President Cheney at
the helm. "Continuity in government" has come to be the most important step
in response to an attack.' The President's plans, apparently limited only to the
executive branch, have led to calls for similar continuity plans for the other
branches.8 However, the focus on continuity ignores concerns about the
7 See President George W. Bush, Remarks Following a Roundtable Discussion on Retirement Savings
and an Exchange with Reporters in Des Moines, Iowa, in 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 316, 317 (Mar. 1,
2002), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2002-presidential-documents
&idocid=pdO4mrO2_txt-23.pdf (comments of President George W. Bush) ("I have an obligation as the
President . . . to the American people to ... put measures in place that should somebody be successful in
attacking Washington, D.C., there's an ongoing government.").
8 See Thomas S. Foley & Newt Gingrich, If Congress Were Attacked, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 2002, at B9
(proposing continuity plan for House of Representatives and Senate); see also Hearing on FY03 Budget for the
Supreme Court Before the S. Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002),
available at http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp/document?_m=e40074de01 b6ca511 abf095 Ieb66a04f
(statements of Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Director of Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, and the Honorable
John G. Heybum II, Chairman, Conference on the Budget of the Judicial Conference of the United States)
(describing continuity-of-operations planning for federal judiciary).
We do not consider continuity or repopulation of the judicial branch. Assuming the terrorist attacks are
targeted at Washington, D.C., the Supreme Court likely would be the primary court disabled. However,
district and appellate courts throughout the nation should continue to function, hearing and deciding cases.
Moreover, to the extent the federal courts need to be actors in any constitutional disputes arising in the early
months after the attack, those disputes must begin in the lower courts and work their way through the system,
and would not get to the Supreme Court for at least a few months, except in the extreme and unusual case. See
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 100 (2001) (tracing chronology in presidential election dispute in which Florida
Supreme Court decided case on December 8, United States Supreme Court granted a stay and certiorari on
December 9, and reversed the state court on December 12); Cass Sunstein, Of Law and Politics, in THE VOTE:
BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT I, 2-4 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001) (tracing
one-month chronology of election and dispute). Repopulation of the Supreme Court, as well as any other
federal courts whose members might be killed in an attack, can await repopulation of the political branches of
the federal government, see infra notes 137-72 and accompanying text, then can proceed via ordinary
procedures of presidential appointment and Senate confirmation.
In the fall of 2002, the American Enterprise Institute and the Brookings Institution jointly established
the Continuity of Government Commission to study and recommend constitutional and statutory reforms to
20031
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legitimacy of any acting federal government. It also obscures the more
important question of repopulating the federal government, of the manner and
timing of choosing new members of Congress, a new president and vice
president, and a new cabinet.
The focus here is on the underlying legal and constitutional assumptions of
these mass-destruction scenarios, the legal and constitutional problems with
proposed solutions, and the creation of continuity and repopulation procedures
that would be constitutionally valid and legitimate. The public as a whole is
likely unconcerned with such legal niceties as the constitutional validity of
what remains of the executive branch after an attack.9  Nevertheless, in
anticipating even the most tragic and unsettling events, we should ensure that
any continuity processes conform to constitutional requirements as well as to
underlying structural principles, such as separation of powers, federalism, and
democracy. 0 And we should make the necessary constitutional or statutory
changes to ensure that the present legal landscape can accommodate a
continuity mechanism in the event of a mass destruction.
I. QUESTIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION
A. Proposed Changes to the Succession Statute
Presidential succession is a mix of constitutional and statutory procedures.
The Constitution provides that, in the event of a vacancy in the presidency, the
vice president becomes president." The Constitution then grants to Congress
the power to provide by law for simultaneous vacancies in both offices by
designating the "Officer" who is to "act as president" until the president is able
handle the mass-destruction scenario in all three branches of the federal government. As this Article went to
press, the Commission was about to release its first report and recommendation on congressional continuity.
9 Cf. Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Low?, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1, 25 (2001) (arguing that the public in 1788 was not concerned with legal niceties of whether the Constitution,
having been ratified, was in fact controlling law, but rather with the concrete problems of putting together a
functioning union).
1O See Wasserman, supra note 1, at 348-51 (discussing the role of structural principles-separation of
powers, democracy, and political partisanship-and how the succession statute conforms to those principles);
see also Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential Succession Law Constitutional?. 48
STAN. L. REV. 113, 139 (1995) (calling for changes to the succession statute because it might make someone
president who is neither legitimate nor constitutional).
11 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § I ("In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death
or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.").
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to resume office or a new president is elected.'2 The designation of an officer
to "act as president" (as opposed to "becom[ing] President")' 3 derives from the
Framers' refusal to grant the legislature the constitutional power to appoint the
executive; Congress may choose someone to act as executive, to occupy the
White House temporarily, but Congress may not appoint a president.' 4  The
distinction largely is semantic, as it appears that the acting president assumes
the whole of the constitutional executive power and may exercise the same
Article 1I powers as a president.'
5
The current succession statute, codified at 3 U.S.C. § 19, was passed in
1947; it provides for succession by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, followed by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate,
followed by cabinet officers, beginning with the Secretary of State and
proceeding according to the age of the department. 6  The statute does not
provide for any officer or individual beyond the cabinet, likely on the 1940s
assumption that the death of every cabinet officer was unlikely and that at least
one enumerated officer always would survive to become acting president.
Several commentators have argued that as a matter of constitutional text
and/or structural principle, legislative officers should not be in the line of
12 See U.S. CONST. art. 11, § I, cl. 6 ("Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death,
Resignation, or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as
President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be
elected.").
13 See Steven G. Calabresi, The Political Question of Presidential Succession, 48 STAN. L. REv. 155,
162-63 n.40 (1995) (arguing that, under the Twenty-fifth Amendment, only the vice president actually
becomes President, but all other successors become acting president).
14 See TADAHISA KURODA, THE ORIGINS OF THE TWELFTH AMENDMENT 8 (1994); Brown &
Cinquegrana, supra note 1, at 1436; Wasserman, supra note 1, at 353; see also id. at 363 (discussing rejection
of legislative appointment of executive under the Constitution in light of concerns that such executive would
lack necessary independence).
15 But see Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 1, at 1442-43 (describing uncertainty as to whether an
acting president could appoint a vice president under the Twenty-fifth Amendment and whether that newly
appointed vice president would become a prior entitled officer who should immediately assume the executive
power). Political fairness might suggest that an acting president ought not nominate federal judges, especially
Supreme Court Justices, who will remain on the court for life. Instead, nominations should await the election
of a new president. See infra notes 157-66 and accompanying text.
16 See 3 U.S.C. § 19(a), (b), (d)(1) (2000) (providing for cabinet succession order of Secretary of State,
Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Secretaries of the Interior, Agriculture,
Commerce, Labor, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, Transportation, Energy,
Education, and Veterans Affairs); see also Amar & Amar, supra note 10, at 134-35; Brown & Cinquegrana,
supra note I, at 1431-33; Wasserman, supra note 1, at 354 & n.32. The new Secretary of Homeland Security,
a position and department established in 2002, should be added to the end of the line. See Homeland Security
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as amended in scattered titles and sections of
U.S.C.) (establishing Department of Homeland Security as an executive department).
2003]
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succession, that the executive power should devolve only to executive branch
officers. 7 The common recommendation is a statute that provides for cabinet
succession only, beginning with the Secretary of State, with a special election
to choose a new president and vice president according to ordinary
constitutional procedures as soon as practicable.'
The only proposed change to § 19 in the wake of September 11 was House
Bill 3816, introduced in the 107th Congress in February 2002, but not acted
upon. The bill made two primary adjustments to the statute. First, the bill
removed the President Pro Tempore from the line of succession in favor of the
Senate Majority or Minority Leader, depending on party control of the Senate
and advance designation by the president.'9 This change recognized that the
President Pro Tempore does not wield primary responsibility for the direction
and control over the legislative or partisan agenda. The President Pro Tempore
is the senior-most member of the Senate majority party and the presiding
officer for debate, but real control over Senate business rests with the party
caucus leaders, particularly the Majority Leader. Second, it gave the president
the power to designate in advance the legislative officer she wants as statutory
successor, either the Speaker or the House Minority Leader and either the
Senate Majority of Minority Leader, depending on whether the president's
party is in the majority or minority in each house of Congress; the president
could change that designation if party control changes in the House, in order to
ensure that her successor always will be the congressional head of her political
party.
20
The solution proposed in House Bill 3816 is troubling. The bill adhered to
the misplaced belief that a member of Congress should be at the head of the
line of double-vacancy succession, a belief that is inconsistent with a proper
understanding of separation of powers and democracy.2' Allowing the
president to designate the legislative head of her own party as successor does
17 See Amar & Amar, supra note 10, at 136 (arguing that the most straightforward reading of the text and
structural considerations demand the conclusion that the Speaker and President Pro Tempore are not "officers"
within the meaning of the Succession Clause); Calabresi, supra note 13, at 156 (agreeing with that conclusion,
but arguing that the matter is a political question, not subject to judicial review); Wasserman, supra note 1, at
409-10 (arguing that considerations of separation of powers, political partisanship, and democracy demand that
executive power devolve to cabinet officers, not congressional officers).
18 See Amar & Amar, supra note 10, at 137-38; Calabresi, supra note 13, at 156; Wasserman, supra note
I, at 410.
19 See H.R. 3816, 107th Cong. § 2 (2002).
20 See id.
21 See Wasserman, supra note 1, at 365, 409; see also Amar & Amar, supra note 10, at 118; Calabresi,
supra note 13, at 163-64.
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remedy one defect in the present statute: the risk of succession bringing about a
change in party control (and policy direction) of the White House when a
Speaker of one political party succeeds a president of another.22 However,
even if party caucus leaders are legislative officers who are constitutionally
eligible for presidential succession, they are legislative officers whose
existence is not constitutionally mandated. The Constitution expressly
commands that there be a Speaker of the House and a President Pro Tempore
of the Senate; 24 it does not require that there be formal party caucuses or
leaders of those caucuses. 2' Each house establishes those and other offices
unilaterally through the power to establish its own rules of operation; 26 each
house also may eliminate them unilaterally. We should hesitate before placing
in the statutory line of presidential succession, established through
bicameralism and presentment, a legislative officer whose position is not
guaranteed by the Constitution and may be eliminated by the singular act of a
simple majority of one house.
B. Extending the Line of Succession
The bigger problem with House Bill 3816 is that it did nothing to improve
the ability of § 19 to address any of the new, supposedly unique concerns
arising from a massive terrorist attack killing more than the president and vice
president and inflicting far greater damage on the structure of the federal
government. The bill continued to assume that one of the top legislative or
cabinet officers will survive to become acting president; it merely tinkered
with partisan elements of succession.
But the reason for having this conversation about "continuity in
government" is the assumption that the new, post-September 11 risk of a larger
and more comprehensive and destructive attack demands more comprehensive
22 See Wasserman, supra note 1, at 386-87. Cf. The West Wing (NBC television broadcast, May 14,
2003) (depicting fictional liberal Democrat President Josiah Bartlett, facing a personal crisis and serving
without a vice president, declaring himself temporarily unable to discharge the power and duties of his office
and transferring executive power to the conservative Republican Speaker of the House).
23 See infra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
24 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 ("The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other
Officers .... "); id. § 3, cl. 5 ("The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President pro tempore, in
the Absence of the Vice President .... ").
25 See Wasserman, supra note 1, at 370 ("The Constitution of 1787 makes no mention of political parties
."); Steven G. Calabresi, Political Parties As Mediating Institutions, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1479, 1494 & n.54
(1994) ("[T]he vast bulk of our Constitution was designed to discourage parties and not to accommodate
them.").
26 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
2003]
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succession considerations. One answer might be a deeper line of succession,
with more officials enumerated in the line, including remaining members of
Congress, state governors, and sub-cabinet level executive officers. But such
extensions of the statutory line demand a constitutional amendment in order to
be implemented. Moreover, an extension of the line of succession would call
into question the democratic legitimacy of any successor and would present
intractable drafting problems for Congress.
1. Rank-and-File Members of Congress
The Constitution empowers Congress to designate the "Officer" who will
act as president." The term "Officer" appears in several places in the
Constitution, but the Succession Clause is the only provision in which the word
appears without some modifier.28 At its narrowest meaning, the unmodified
"Officer" could be shorthand for "Officers of the United States" or "Officers
under the United States," synonymous terms which include executive branch
officers only.' 9 The Speaker of the House and President Pro Tempore of the
Senate perhaps are legislative officers, ° but they are not officers of or under
the United States. It thus is at least textually arguable that they do not fall
within the unmodified "Officers" in the Succession Clause.3  On this
understanding, only executive branch officers are eligible to act as president
but no member of Congress is eligible to do so.
27 See id. art. 11, § 1, cl. 6.
28 Compare id. art. I1, § 6, cl. I ("Officer"), with, id. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 ("No Senator or Representative shall,
during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United
States... and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during
his Continuance in Office.") (emphasis added), id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[A]nd he shall nominate, and by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... all other Officers of the United States .... ) (emphasis
added), and id. art. 11 § 4 ("The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be
removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors.") (emphasis added). See also Amar & Amar, supra note 10, at 114-17; Calabresi, supra note
13, at 158-60.
29 See Amar & Amar, supra note 10, at 115-16 ("[Flederal legislators are neither 'Officers under the
United States,' nor (to the extent that there is any difference) 'Officers of the United States."'); Calabresi,
supra note 13, at 163 ("[lit is more likely than not that the word 'Officer' means 'Officer of the United
States."').
30 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 ("The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other
Officers .... ); id. § 3, cl. 5 ("The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President pro tempore, in
the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United States."); see
also John F. Manning, Not Proved: Some Lingering Questions About Legislative Succession to the Presidency,
48 STAN. L. REV. 141, 143 (1995) (describing the Speaker and President Pro Tempore as officers of both
houses of Congress).
31 See Amar & Amar, supra note 10, at 137; Calabresi, supra note 13, at 159.
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The counterargument is that the unmodified term "Officers" is broader than
"Officers of the United States" and also may include legislative officers, such
as the Speaker and President Pro Tempore.32 Selection of some members of
each house as legislative officers places them in a different class than other
legislators and makes them constitutionally eligible for succession. But it does
not necessarily follow that rank-and-file members of Congress similarly are
eligible for succession. The Succession Clause might permit succession by the
smaller group of legislative officers but not the larger group of ordinary
legislators who have not taken the next step of being selected as legislative
officers." This extension to rank-and-file representatives would require a
constitutional amendment.
Constitutionality aside, this extension would be impossible to draft. How
would Congress determine a succession order among members of Congress?
Legislation must be written in broad, general terms, in order to have full
prospective effect and to apply not only to current circumstances and the
current Congress, but to similar circumstances in future Congresses. An
extended succession order must be established without reference to the current
political landscape and current political interests, by referencing only particular
Senate or House seats from particular states or districts without regard to who
holds any seat at a given time and without regard to the seniority or political
34party affiliation of the present holder of that seat.
An extended statute inevitably would have to order among particular states
and districts. But how can Congress neutrally decide whether a representative
from New York should be higher in the succession line than a representative
from Alabama or from Colorado or from Illinois? Even within a given state,
who from the New York delegation should be higher in the line, someone from
a rural upstate district, from a suburban Long Island district, or from New York
City? Who from California should be higher, a representative from San
Francisco or from Orange County?
32 See Manning, supra note 30, at 144 (arguing that the failure to use the phrase "Officers of the United
States" suggests that the Succession Clause refers to a broader class of actors).
33 See id. at 143 (suggesting an understanding of the word "Officer" in the Succession Clause that would
exclude ordinary legislators but include the officers of both houses of Congress).
34 See Calabresi, supra note 13, at 156 n.8 (arguing that a succession scheme must be unaffected by the
political leanings of the current occupants of the offices that might be. placed in the line of succession and
calling for consideration of the matter "behind a veil of ignorance"); Elizabeth Garrett, lIstitutional Lessons
front the 2000 Presidential Election, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 975, 986 (2001) (emphasizing the need for a
detailed ex ante framework on selection issues to constrain discretion and channel partisanship).
20031
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Geographic and regional conflicts made compromise at the Constitutional
Convention difficult enough. 5 Such conflicts remain, between the Northeast
and Midwest, between the South and the Pacific Northwest, among rural,
urban, and suburban areas.36 One need only look at the map from the 2000
presidential election to know that regional and geographic differences remain
ever-present. The very act of proposing and establishing an order among
members of Congress introduces favoritism and nonuniformity not subject to
clear compromise; it creates the very inter-state or inter-region conflicts that
the Framers sought to minimize. At best, a statute might provide for
succession in general terms according to seniority of members, without
specifying particular seats. But that still leaves the question of how to decide
among numerous members having equal seniority, requiring the same difficult
ordering among states and districts.
Finally, there would be structural problems with the national democratic
legitimacy of a rank-and-file legislator acting as president. The notion that the
Speaker of the House is a nationally democratic choice to act as president is
based on the fact that the Speaker is (as a matter of practice) a member of the
House, elected by the voters of her congressional district, and is placed in the
Speakership by a majority of all the members of the House, themselves
popularly elected." In other words, the Speaker, popularly elected by her own
local constituency, receives an additional, broader popular imprimatur and
democratic legitimacy via the other members of the House, who together
reflect a national constituency. Whatever the merits of that view of the
Speaker," that token of nationwide legitimacy is absent as to the ordinary
House member who never received even indirect approval by any constituency
beyond a majority of the voters in her congressional district.
35 See Amar & Amar, supra note 10, at 117 n.25; Michael B. Schill, Intergovernmental Takings and Just
Compensation: A Question of Federalism, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 829, 887 (1989) ("Conflict among regions has
played a central role in the history of the nation. Fears of interstate rivalry and exploitation took on great
importance at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and the ensuing ratification process."); id. at 868 n.146
(describing concerns at Convention for large states, particularly from the South, dominating small states,
particularly from the North).
36 See Schill, supra note 35, at 887 (describing a rise in conflicts among states and regions in the late
1980s).
37 See Harry S. Truman, Special Message to the Congress on Succession to the Presidency, in PUB.
PAPERS 128, 129 (June 19, 1945); see also Wasserman, supra note 1, at 356-57 (describing Truman's
arguments in favor of an altered succession order).
38 See Wasserman, supra note I, at 403-05 (questioning the conclusion that the Speaker is a more
democratic official, on the national level, than a cabinet officer who has been hand-picked by the nationally
elected president to help carry out the executive power).
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2. State Governors
It similarly would be constitutionally impermissible, politically unfeasible,
and nationally undemocratic to include state governors in the line of
succession. The best reading of the word "Officer" in the Succession Clause,
unmodified by reference to any level of government, means an officer of the
government of the United States, of the federal government, an officer holding
a position created by and drawing authority from the federal Constitution or
federal law. 39 A state governor is not an officer eligible for succession under
this view. This reading is historically sound, given the Framers' intention to
create a stronger, more national, and more independent central government.
40
That purpose is undermined if federal executive power devolves to a person
whose office and authority, the basis for her eligibility to act as president, are
grounded entirely in state law and whose loyalties perhaps lie more with state
than national interests.
The same problems of sectional favoritism and nonuniformity arise in
placing governors in the line.4' How can Congress decide between the
governors of New York and Virginia or California and Kansas or Mississippi
and Ohio? Any choice again reflects regional and geographic biases, and any
attempt to draw these lines again requires Congress to yield to the regional
conflicts that the Constitution seeks to limit.
Finally, like a rank-and-file member of Congress, a state governor never
has been presented to or subject to consideration by a nationwide electoral
constituency, even indirectly. The governor lacks any possible nationwide
democratic legitimacy in acting as president. Her public support base is
limited to her state-wide constituency and no national body or electoral
constituency accords any imprimatur to her service at the head of the federal
executive branch.
3. Sub-Cabinet Executive Branch Officers
The third possible extension of the line of succession would include sub-
cabinet-level executive officers, undersecretaries, and deputies. Such inferior
officers are officers of or under the United States, unquestionably eligible
39 See Amar & Amar, supra note 10, at 117; Calabresi, supra note 13, at 161; Manning, supra note 30, at
143.




officers for Succession Clause purposes, even under the narrowest view of that
term. Because they are members of the executive branch, there also is no
separation of powers problem with their succession to the White House.
But democratic problems nevertheless remain with their elevation. The
argument against primary cabinet succession was the perceived undemocratic
quality of the president appointing her own contingent successor, as compared
42to succession by a popularly elected member of Congress. These concerns
are alleviated by a proper understanding of the true democratic quality of
cabinet officers, which derives from two sources. First, cabinet members draw
apostolic democratic legitimacy by virtue of their selection by the nationally
41
elected populist president to help carry out the executive power. Second, they
gain national democratic legitimacy by virtue of their confirmation by a
majority of the Senate, whose members are popularly elected.4
The latter democratic imprimatur is absent with respect to many deputies
and under-secretaries, appointed exclusively and unilaterally by the president
or, still more problematically, by a cabinet officer or department head herself
not popularly elected by any constituency.45 Such inferior officers would be
fairly low in the statutory order, succeeding only in the event of this feared
destruction of the entire upper tier of the federal government. But their
succession, even on an emergency, short-term, and unlikely basis, remains
subject to democratic objection.
Including inferior officers in the line of succession also creates drafting
problems, There is no obvious way to order the myriad inferior officers across
executive departments and agencies. Who ranks (or should rank) higher in a
presidential administration for succession purposes-the Deputy Secretary of
Defense (whose boss, the Secretary of Defense, is fifth in the current statutory
order) or the Director of Policy Planning for the State Department (whose boss,
the Secretary of State, is third in the current order)? The answer actually may
vary depending on the administration and its particular policy focus. Age of
42 See Truman, supra note 37, at 129 (arguing that in a democracy the chief executive should not have
the power to appoint her own successor); see also Wasserman, supra note 1, at 403-09 (rejecting Truman's
arguments about the undemocratic nature of succession by cabinet appointees).
43 See Amar & Amar, supra note 10, at 131; Calabresi, supra note 13, at 173; Wasserman, supra note 1,
at 406-07.
44 See Wasserman, supra note 1, at 405-06 (arguing that cabinet officers draw nationwide democratic
legitimacy from confirmation by a majority of a popularly elected Senate).
45 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 ("Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.").
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department is a useful line when ordering among cabinet officers, all of whom
stand on the same level; it is far less useful with regard to lower-level officers,
given the numbers and permutations of hierarchy within each department.
This discussion suggests that, while a deeper line of succession might help
handle the new worst-case scenario of large-scale destruction of the top tier of
the federal government, there is no constitutional or practical basis for any of
the possible extensions. The current statute exhausts the existing officers who
constitutionally and/or practically can act as president. The current line must
be the starting point for any continuity-in-government scheme intended to
handle the new mass-destruction contingency.
Congress could expand the number of eligible successors by creating new
cabinet departments and cabinet-level officers. Among these new officers
could be a designated second successor (after the vice president), one officer
whose official job is to become acting president in the event of a double
vacancy and whose confirmation process would take into account this specific
role.46  The First Secretary always would head the shadow government
conducting business in the bunker and always would remain behind during the
State of the Union Address. At heart, this officer's job would be to stay
outside of Washington and away from the president and vice president at all
times, ensuring that she would not be killed in any attack on the capital.
New cabinet departments aside, the better approach to this problem is not
to expand the universe of successors, but to use the cabinet and legislative
officers currently enumerated in the statute in a different order and a different
manner.
II. CONTINUING AND REPOPULATING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The responses to the new worst-case scenario focus on "continuity in
government," on keeping the federal government in operation by empowering
the remnants, no matter how skeletal, of the original structure. The deceptively
simple idea, as President Bush explained, is that "should somebody be
successful in attacking Washington, D.C., there's an ongoing government.
"
46 See Amar & Amar, supra note 10, at 131 (suggesting the creation of the cabinet post of "First
Secretary," an officer whose specific and intended role is to serve as contingent successor); see also supra note
16.
47 See Bush, supra note 7, at 317.
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Continuity in government raises two distinct but related issues-continuity of
the federal government structure and repopulation of federal offices.
A. Continuity in Government
1. Of Shadow Governments and Skeletal Congresses
The most-discussed element of continuity is the "shadow government" plan
created by the Bush administration, which has not been explained to Congress
or to the public and about which few details are known. The plans apparently
involve members of each executive agency and department working on a
rotating basis in an undisclosed secure location, preparing to assume power in
the event of the complete annihilation of the federal government. The shadow
government really is a shadow executive branch and bureaucracy, with no
apparent provisions made for continuity either in Congress or the judiciary.
This has prompted calls for the other branches to take similar precautions to
ensure their own continuity. 8
Absent from any discussions of the shadow government is mention of a
specific head of that government. We do not know whether any provision has
been made to ensure that a constitutional or statutory successor to the
presidency is present in the bunker at all times. Vice President Cheney
apparently has spent a great deal of time since September 11 in undisclosed
• 49
secure locations. It also is possible that among the officers working at the
undisclosed location at any one time is at least one cabinet officer who would
be a proper contingent successor under § 19. Either step ensures some
constitutional and structural legitimacy in the continuity government by
providing an individual in whom the executive power under the Constitution
can be vested.0
One glaring problem with the President's continuity plan is that, to the
extent Vice President Cheney does not head the shadow government and a
48 See Foley & Gingrich, supra note 8 (proposing scheme for continuity in House of Representatives and
suggesting that Senate continuity would occur through temporary appointments under the Seventeenth
Amendment); see also supra note 8.
49 See Bush, supra note 7, at 317 (explaining that Vice President Cheney was staying in undisclosed
locations as part of the continuity plans).
50 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. I ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America."); see also Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1231, 1242 (1994) ("[Tlhat power to execute the laws is vested, not in the executive department of the national
government, but in 'a President of the United States of America."').
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cabinet officer emerges from the bunker, that officer leapfrogs the two
legislative officers who (rightly or wrongly) are the proper immediate
successors under the current statute. We do not know what role the Speaker or
President Pro Tempore plays in the shadow executive branch or whether
provision has been made for their security. This might reflect the belief that
cabinet officers are more appropriate presidential successors. 5' It also reflects
the practical fact that it is easier to secure the prospective safety of a cabinet
officer. The vice president or a cabinet secretary might be able to spend
several months incommunicado in a secure location; neither the Speaker nor
the President Pro Tempore could do the same, given their responsibilities in
Congress and to their constituents in their home states. Assuming that the
continuity plans require one proper successor (the vice president or a § 19
officer) in the hideaway at all times, it is more workable for that successor to
be a cabinet officer rather than a legislative officer. This practical
consideration provides strong additional support for redrafting § 19 to place
cabinet officers, beginning with the Secretary of State, at the front of the line
of succession."
In the absence of this statutory change, the President's continuity plan
creates confusion whenever the secured successor is not the vice president.
Imagine a coordinated series of attacks involving ten nuclear devices hidden in
backpacks throughout Washington, D.C., killing the president, vice president,
and everyone named in § 19 except the President Pro Tempore and the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, who was taking her turn in the
bunker at the time of the attack. The Administration plan assumes that the
HUD Secretary will become acting president. But the President Pro Tempore
is the rightful acting president under § 19." Who should the public follow?
Who should the state governments follow? Who should the remainder of the
federal government follow? Most importantly, who should the military obey
as Commander-in-Chief and repository of control over the nation's nuclear
arsenal and any retaliation plans?
51 See Calabresi, supra note 13, at 156 (arguing for cabinet succession); Wasserman, supra note 1, at 368
(arguing for cabinet succession as the approach most consistent with structural concerns); see also Amar &
Amar, supra note 10, at 114 (arguing that legislative officers are constitutionally excluded from the line of
presidential succession). But see Truman, supra note 37, at 129 (arguing that legislative succession is more
democratic, because the successor has stood for popular election at some level).
52 See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 149-56 and accompanying text.
13 See 3 U.S.C. § 19(b) (2000).
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This question becomes even more confused in light of the supplantation
provision of § 19, which permits the President Pro Tempore-as a "prior
entitled individual" under the statute-to replace the HUD Secretary as acting
president at any time and for any reason.54 Considering the above scenario, we
can imagine the HUD Secretary emerging from the secure location as acting
president as planned, serving in that role for two weeks, then being supplanted
by the President Pro Tempore. Again, who would the people, the states, and
the rest of the federal government follow? 55 We can remedy this problem by
eliminating the supplantation provisions, which do little more than create
mischief in any event.56
Larger problems arise in the event that continuity plans make no specific
provision for the security of any proper statutory successor. Such a plan might
assume that the "federal government" has some meaning and existence apart
from the officers chosen via direct or indirect democratic processes. It rests on
the view that the executive power need not be vested in any individual because
it is vested in the executive agencies and departments themselves.57 These
agencies and departments properly may continue operating in the wake of the
terrorist attack, even absent a president or acting president. A continuity-in-
government plan premised on that understanding would signal the denouementS 58
to the ongoing demise of the unitary executive. Executive power
unquestionably can be delegated by the president to the agencies and
departments. 59 But a continuing executive branch without a president or acting
54 See id. § 19(d)(2) (providing that a cabinet officer ceases to act as president after a "qualified and
prior-entitled individual is able to act," including the Speaker or President Pro Tempore); see also Brown &
Cinquegrana, supra note I, at 1437-38; Wasserman, supra note 1, at 366-67.
55 Political partisanship concerns may exacerbate this problem, as the President Pro Tempore is more
likely to supplant the HUD Secretary when they are from different political parties. See Wasserman, supra
note 1, at 384. Public officials perhaps would put partisan gamesmanship to one side in the wake of a massive
attack on the federal government, at least for a while. Or perhaps they would not. In any event, the lack of
clarity in the situation, a result both of the supplantation provision and the lack of information about the Bush
continuity plan, invites the potential for that very mischief.
56 See Amar & Amar, supra note 10, at 135 (arguing that the supplantation provisions are un-
constitutional and that "Iblumping creates huge problems of logistics and fosters gamesmanship"); Americo R.
Cinquegrana, Presidential Succession Under 3 U.S.C. § 19 and the Separation of Powers: "If at First You
Don't Succeed, Try, Try Again, " 20 HASTINGS CoNs'r. L.Q. 105, 140 (1992) (arguing that the supplantation
provisions serve no legitimate lawmaking purpose).
57 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 54-55 (1994); Thomas 0. McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulator), Agency Decisionnaking, 36
AM. U. L. REV. 443, 465-72 (1987).
58 See Lawson, supra note 50, at 1245 (discussing the "death of the unitary executive").
" See id. 1243-44 n.72.
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president goes one step further by permitting the delagatee to exercise power in
the complete absence of any living delegator of that power.
The military raises particular concern. The president herself is Com-
mander-in-Chief of the armed forces, a position at the very heart of the
executive power.6° Civilian control of the military was understood as a
necessary cornerstone of republican government, ensuring the primacy of civil
authority over military authority.' Any continuity plans that do not provide
for and ensure a proper successor to the presidency are constitutionally infirm
in not guaranteeing a civilian Commander-in-Chief, a single individual to
62
maintain civil power and control over the military. Suppose state and local
authorities are unable to keep the peace in the wake of the destructive attack;S 63
assuming that declaration of martial law might be an option, who could
exercise the option if there is no acting president at the head of the military to
make that declaration? Moreover, how would the armed forces carry out a
military response to the terrorist attack in the absence of a civilian at the top of
the military hierarchy? It either would be prevented from acting or would act
in disregard of civilian control. Neither option is desirable or acceptable.
60 See U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 2, cl. 1 ("The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy
of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United
States .... "); THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 385-86 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (likening
the President's power to a governor's power over the state militia, as first general and admiral); see also THE
FEDERALIST No. 74, at 415 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The direction of war implies
the direction of the common strength; and the power of directing and employing the common strength forms a
usual and essential part in the definition of executive authority.").
61 See HAROLD HONGIU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE
IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 77 (1990) (describing the Framers' desire to maintain civilian control over the military);
Michael J. Glennon & Allison R. Hayward, Collective Security and the Constitution: Can the Commander in
Chief Power Be Delegated to the United Nations?, 82 GEO. L.J. 1573, 1591 (1994) (arguing that the
Commander-in-Chief Clause established unquestioned civilian control over the nation's military); Jonathan
Turley, The Military Pocket Republic, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 22 (2002) ("ITihe Framers took every precaution
to keep the military small and subordinate."); see also THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 14 (U.S.
1776) (enumerating grievances against King of England, including rendering "the Military independent of and
superior to the Civil power"); THE FEDERALIST No. 8, at 38 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(describing the concern that the military state would become elevated above the civil state); Turley, supra, at
16 ("[A] wise and prudent people will always have a watchful & [sic] a jealous eye over it; for the maxims and
rules of the army, are essentially different from the genius of a free people, and the laws of a free government."
(citation omitted)).
62 Cf Glennon & Hayward, supra note 61, at 1593 ("[A]t a minimum[,] the President's Commander in
Chief power guarantees him command over the nation's armed forces.").
63 Cf Major Kirk L. Davies, The Imposition of Martial Law in the United States, 48 A.F. L. REV. 67, 85
(2000) ("[S]hould civilian agencies become overwhelmed in an environment of chaos and panic, one of the
President's obvious options for restoring order would be to declare martial law.").
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The Administration plan also assumes that the executive branch, the federal
bureaucracy, and the military can continue to operate in the absence of
Congress. Whatever the enhanced power and stature of the modem
presidency, 64 the Constitution still demands that laws be approved by (at least)
majorities in both houses and signed by the president.6- The primary structural
precept of the American constitutional order remains separation of powers,
which necessarily assumes some significant role for Congress in the process of
govemance.6 A surviving executive branch cannot alone pass new legislation,
appropriate or mint new money, declare war or appropriate funds to fight that
war, or carry out many of the responsibilities of governance, powers vested
exclusively in Congress. 67 True continuity of the federal government demands
continuity of both political branches; a functioning executive branch cannot
alone be sufficient to maintain a functioning national government unless we
accept the premise that the terrorist attacks undid the constitutional structure.
Congressional continuity also enables executive continuity. Chances are
great that some members of both houses of Congress will survive an attack
directed at Washington, given the greater numbers in Congress and the fact
that individual members often are away from Washington visiting their home
states or districts. Other than an assault directly on the Capitol during full
sessions of both houses, it would be difficult to kill 535 members of Congress
at once. A working Congress composed of those surviving members ensures
the constitutional validity of any post-attack actions taken by the acting
64 See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1727 (1996) ("Never has
the executive branch been more powerful, nor more dominant over its two counterparts, than since the New
Deal.").
65 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 2; INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946-51 (1983) (discussing importance
of Bicameralism and Presentment requirements); Lawson & Seidman, supra note 9, at 6 ("The federal
government could not pass laws, appoint officials, or enter into treaties without a Congress, Senate, and a
President."); John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority
Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483, 486 (1995).
66 See Calabresi, supra note 13, at 163 ("[Wle must remember that our Constitution is built on a
presidential/separation of powers premises .... "); Laura S. Fitzgerald, Cadenced Power: The Kinetic
Constitution, 46 DuKE L.J. 679, 688 (1997) ("[Tlhe separation of powers principle serves mostly as a line-
drawing tool to mark the boundary between one institution's constitutional tasks and those reserved to
another."); Flaherty, supra note 64, at 1819 (describing the president as "legislator-in-chief," drafting bills for
Congress to work over and approve); Lawson, supra note 50, at 1239 ("Congress must make whatever policy
decisions are sufficiently important to the statutory scheme at issue so that Congress must make them.").
67 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 (enumerating congressional powers); see also Lawson, supra note 50, at
1238 ("The institutions of the national government are creatures of the Constitution and must find
constitutional authorization for any action.").
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president and the continuing executive branch, particularly in approving
68
military action and appropriating money to prosecute that war.
Congressional continuity also may guarantee a valid successor to the
presidency. Consider a scenario in which the president, vice president, and all
cabinet officers, along with the Speaker, President Pro Tempore, party caucus
leaders, and most members of both houses of Congress have been killed in
coordinated terrorist attacks; 101 House members and 21 Senators remain,
along with numerous mid-level executive branch officers. At this point, there
is no president and no proper statutory successor who could act as president.
However, both houses of Congress might be able to continue operations
with the surviving members. The first operative step in each house will be to
choose a new Speaker and new President Pro Tempore.69 Both legislators now
become legislative officers and designated statutory successors under § 19,
either of whom may resign her legislative office and seat and be sworn as
acting president.7° In other words, the naming of the new Speaker provides the
means for naming a new acting president. With this proper individual now
acting as president and holding the executive power under the Constitution,
any actions by the skeletal executive bureaucracy become constitutionally
sound and structurally consistent, with an acting president and a functioning
(albeit small) Congress.
Legislative officers are not primary successors under a succession scheme
that best conforms to structural principles of separation of powers, political
partisanship, and democracy.7 However, legislative officers play an important
68 See, e.g., Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
(authorizing president to use force against terrorist groups in response to September 11 attacks); Foreign
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-115, 115
Stat. 2118 (2002) (appropriating funds for prosecution of War Against Terrorism); Department of Defense and
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United
States Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-117, 115 Stat. 2230 (same); Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (establishing provisions regarding law enforcement, investigation, and
prosecution of terrorist activities).
69 See I DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 1789-1791, at 7 (Linda Grant De
Pauw et al. eds., 1972) (showing that the United States Senate, having a quorum for first time under the new
Constitution on April 6, 1789, elected a President of the Senate, for the sole purpose of opening and counting
ballots for president of the United States and for continuing business until the vice president was sworn); 3 id.
at 7 (showing that House of Representatives, having attained a quorum for the first time under the Constitution
on April 1, 1789, immediately proceeded to election of Speaker of the House).
70 3 U.S.C. § 19(a), (b) (2000). See Manning, supra note 30, at 143-45.
71 See Wasserman, supra note 1, at 352.
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role in the more extreme vacancy scenarios now under consideration. If there
no longer is a head of the executive branch, the succession line must continue
somewhere in the federal government. The two legislative officers whose
existence is constitutionally mandated are the best (perhaps only) direction for
the succession line to take." A working skeletal House of Representatives
provides that proper successor through the selection of a new Speaker from
among its members.7 Section 19 should keep the Speaker and President Pro
Tempore in the line of succession, eligible to succeed to the White House, but
at the end of the line; legislative officers should assume the executive power
only if the vice president and every top cabinet officer is dead or disabled.
2. Quorum Questions
A related concern is whether the decimated Congress could continue its
operations with only 101 House members and 21 Senators. The Constitution
provides that "a Majority of each [house] shall constitute a Quorum to do
Business. 74 The catastrophic attack might destroy that quorum in one or both
houses, rendering them unable to function as a national legislature, including
unable to select a new Speaker or President Pro Tempore, at least until the
vacant seats can be filled.75
This scenario raises an open constitutional question. The Constitution does
not define how the quorum is measured, whether by majority of authorized
seats in a house or by majority of occupied seats, of living, already-selected
members of each body. In other words, must vacant seats count in the quorum
denominator? The skeletal post-attack Congress only can function if the
constitutional denominator is based on those 101 living House members, such
that House business, including the selection of a Speaker (who then may
72 See supra notes 27-46 and accompanying text.
73 One perhaps could argue that succession by a Speaker chosen by a skeletal 101-member House is as
undemocratic as succession by a rank-and-file House member. See supra notes 27-38 and accompanying text.
After all, the former was not really approved by a nationwide constituency, given the small number of House
members, perhaps not representing every state, who voted her into the Speakership. Nevertheless, selection
into the top position in the House, even if only a skeletal House, grants the Speaker some broader approval
than the local electoral support accorded to rank-and-file members. Moreover, this procedure obviates the
need for legislation to undertake the impossible task of ranking among states and congressional districts in
establishing a succession order. The House chooses a particular individual to be Speaker through its own
internal processes and that choice becomes the eligible presidential successor.
74 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 1; see also United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892); THE
FEDERALIST No. 58, at 329 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
75 See Foley & Gingrich, supra note 8.
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become acting president), can continue when a majority of fifty-one members
are present.
The point here is not to resolve the question. The strongest argument for a
denominator based on seats actually filled by living members comes from
common sense. Common sense dictates that the federal government should
not allow itself to be paralyzed by a violent assault directed against
government officials. If dead members of Congress whose seats have not yet
been filled must be included in the quorum denominator, then a terrorist attack
could prevent one or both houses from attaining a quorum, and therefore
prevent Congress from functioning, not only in response to the attack itself but
also as to the continued needs of governance. To paraphrase Senator Bingham,
speaking to the effect of Southern secession on the ratification of the
Reconstruction Amendments, it is simply inconceivable that the Constitution
enables the planners of a large-scale military or terrorist attack so to interfere
with its operation."'
Actual practice during the First Congress may provide some guidance.77
Congress met for the first time on Wednesday, March 4, 1789.7' Neither house
had a quorum on that date and both adjourned, doing so repeatedly for the next
76 See John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 375, 421
(2001) (discussing arguments of Senator Bingham that Southern ratification of the Civil War Amendments
was unnecessary because "it is simply inconceivable that the Constitution allows traitors so to interfere with its
operation").
77 See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1801, at 3
(1997) ("[l1n a very real sense it can be said that the First Congress was a sort of continuing constitutional
convention, and not simply because so many of its members . . . had helped to compose or to ratify the
Constitution itself."); 2 FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
1765-1895, at 176-77 (1901) (noting the number of members of the First Congress who had participated in the
Constitutional Convention or in the ratifying conventions).
78 See CURRIE, supra note 77, at 3; 2 THORPE, supra note 77, at 176; 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 1789-1791, supra note 69, at 3; 3 id. at 3. That date is understood as the point at
which the Constitution came into operation. See Owings v. Speed, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 420, 422 (1820)
(holding that the Constitution of the United States came into operation on the first Wednesday in March,
1789); 2 THORPE, supra note 77, at 175 & n. 1. But see Lawson & Seidman, supra note 9, at 37 (arguing that
the Constitution became law over a period of time, as different aspects of the document became active at
different points between August 1788 and April 1789).
20031
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
month.79 The House of Representatives finally attained a quorum of thirty on
April 1, the Senate a quorum of twelve on April 6.80
The actions of the Senate during this period are illustrative. On March 11,
1789, the eight present Senators, on behalf of themselves and the eighteen
present House members, sent a letter to twelve absent Senators, emphasizing
the "utmost importance" of a quorum sufficient to proceed to business,
requesting that the absent Senators communicate "information of their
situation," and requesting that the absent members attend as soon as possible."
This request or compulsion for attendance only could be sent to a Senator-
someone already selected for his seat and able to assume that position once he
presented himself. A letter compelling attendance could not have been sent
where the Senate seat had yet to be filled.
The denominator for the first Senate quorum did not include seats for
Rhode Island and North Carolina, neither of which had yet ratified the
Constitution.1 This makes twenty-two the maximum quorum denominator,
reflecting the total number of seats in the Senate, requiring twelve for a
quorum. However, New York did not select its two Senators until July 1789;
the two Senate seats from New York were vacant when the Senate first
convened.8' Thus, a denominator based only on elected members/occupied
seats in March would have been twenty and a majority of eleven would have
established a quorum. But the Senate did not deem itself to have a quorum
79 See CURRIE, supra note 77, at 3; 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 1789-
1791, supra note 69, at 3 (Senate Journal showing eight Senators present ); 3 id. at 3 (Journal of the House of
Representatives, showing 13 Representatives, less than a "quorum of the whole number"); 2 THORPE, supra
note 77, at 176.
80 See I DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 1789-1791, supra note 69, at 7
(showing on April 6, 1789 the presence of a "majority of the whole number of Senators of the United States");
3 id. at 7 (showing on April 1, 1789, in the House of Representatives "a quorum, consisting of a majority of
the whole number, being present"); 2 THORPE, supra note 77, at 176.
81 See CURRIE, supra note 77, at 3; 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 1789-
1791, supra note 69 at 3-4 & n.2; I id. at 5 (noting a similar letter sent March 18, 1789, to eight absent
Senators); see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. I (providing that a number less than a quorum may compel the
attendance of absent members). The first letter was addressed to Tristram Dalton, William Paterson, Jonathan
Elmer, George Read, Richard Bassett, Charles Carroll, John Henry, Richard Henry Lee, William Grayon,
Ralph Izard, Pierce Butler, and James Gunn. See I DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL
CONGRESS 1789-1791, supra note 69, at 4. The second letter was sent to Elmer, Paterson, Read, Bassett,
Carroll, Henry, Lee, and Grayson. See I id. at 5.
82 See 2 THORPE, supra note 77, at 177.
83 See KURODA, supra note 14, at 48; see also I DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL
CONGRESS 1789-1791, supra note 69, at 91 (showing the first presentation of Sen. Rufus King of New York on
July 25, 1789).
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when eleven Senators were present on March 2 8 ; 84 it found a quorum only after
a twelfth Senator, Richard Henry Lee of Virginia, presented his credentials on
April 6.8 In other words, the First Senate demanded a quorum of a majority of
twenty-two possible seats, whether or not those seats had, in fact, been filled.
But consider the mischief that could have arisen during this period if that
larger denominator were constitutionally mandated. Although opponents of
the Constitution generally fell into line once a given state had ratified,86 the
influence of Anti-Federalists continued. This risked, in the eyes of Federalists,
"much mischief. ' '87 In New York, ongoing disagreements between Federalists
and Anti-Federalists prevented the legislature from choosing electors to vote in
the first presidential election and from selecting Senators until July.88 Suppose
other states similarly had delayed choosing Senators and Representatives. If
those unfilled seats must count in the quorum denominator, the few entrenched
opponents of the Constitution could have prevented Congress, and by
extension the federal government, from ever transacting business by depriving
it of the machinery of governance: a Congress and a president to pass laws and
appoint officials.' 9  The Constitution established a majority as quorum
specifically to prevent such a minority from scuttling the ability of Congress to
act.9°  The larger denominator, if constitutionally required, would have
84 See I DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 1789-1791, supra note 69, at 6
(reflecting first appearance of Sen. Jonathan Elmer of New Jersey, an eleventh Senator, but the adjournment of
business because of the absence of a quorum).
85 See I id. at 6-7
86 See CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA 306 (1966) ("Perhaps this is endemic to
America; once the vote is counted, everybody wants to be in the parade.").
87 See 2 THORPE, supra note 77, at 175.
88 See KURODA, supra note 14, at 39 ("No state offers a better example of how rival political interests
and ideas affected the choice of [federal officials] in 1789 than New York, a late, reluctant, and divided
supporter of the Constitution."); id. at 48-49 (discussing lessons learned in New York from the long debates
and the lack of participation in the first presidential election); id. at 48 (discussing belated selection of two
Senators); 2 THORPE, supra note 77, at 177 ("New York, obedient to the influence of [Anti-Federalist
Governor] Clinton, had refused to appoint electors[.]"); see also BOWEN, supra note 86, at 306 (describing
New York's grudging, conditions-filled ratification, including suggestion by one Anti-Federalist that New
York declare its right to withdraw from the Union after a number of years if suggested amendments were not
considered).
89 See 2 THORPE, supra note 77, at 176 ("All through the winter of 1789, the supporters of the
Constitution were anxious lest in some way its enemies might yet cause delay, or even overthrow the plan.");
Lawson & Seidman, supra note 9, at 6, 8 (discussing the need for states to select people to operate the
machinery of government). The Framers explicitly avoided this problem with regard to the presidency by
requiring the president to win only a majority of votes from electors actually appointed. See U.S. CONST. art.
I1, § 1, cl. 3. ("The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if such Number be a
Majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed .... ").
90 See THE FEDERALIST No. 58, at 361 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (explaining that the
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permitted states, or factions within states, to delay the effectiveness of the
Constitution and the ability of the new government to function, contrary to the
very purpose of the Quorum Clause.
Another possibility is that the Constitution leaves it to each house to
prescribe the method for measuring and determining the quorum and
denominator.9' The current Senate rule requires a "majority of the Senators
duly chosen and sworn." 92 The House rule is less specific, although it does
provide that during quorum calls the "names of Members" are to be called.93
The focus on "members" in both rules is logically distinct from "seats" and
suggests elected, sworn, living members of the body. It would make little
sense for "members" to include vacant seats or nonliving members whose seats
had not been filled. At the very least, each house might possess the
constitutional power to establish a smaller quorum denominator on the number
of living members in occupied seats.
Measuring the quorum by the number of surviving members also obviates
one of the stranger and more troubling aspects of the proposal for
congressional continuity proffered by former Speakers Thomas Foley and
Newt Gingrich. They suggest that the House of Representatives, pursuant to
its power to establish rules of proceedings, authorize each member to
predesignate an interim successor, who would occupy that seat during the
period between the catastrophic loss of House members and the election of a
successor.94 Their goal is to ensure that the House is able to maintain a quorum
during the possibly lengthy interim period.9 But if the required denominator is
only sworn living House members occupying seats, a small quorum to do
business can be attained by the presence of a majority of surviving members,
quorum requirement was set at a majority so that the minority could not wield too much power with regard to
the legislature's ability to act); McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 65, at 487 n.14 (same); see also Records of
the Federal Convention, in 2 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 289 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987) (quoting arguments from Convention as to a proper legislative quorum).
91 See United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1892) (stating that the Constitution requires the presence
of a majority, from which the power of each house arises, and that in the absence of guidance from the
Constitution, "it is therefore within the competency of the house to prescribe any method which shall be
reasonably certain to ascertain" whether a majority is present); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 ("Each
House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings .... ").
92 See STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE No. 108-15, Rule VI, at 4 (2003).
93 See RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 107th Congress, Rule XX(3), at 29 (2001).
94 See Foley & Gingrich, supra note 8. Senate vacancies are filled by gubernatorial appointments. See
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, cl. 2; see also infra notes 133-45 and accompanying text.
95 See Foley & Gingrich, supra note 8 (noting that in recent cases it has taken an average of 117 days to
fill House vacancies).
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51 of the surviving 101 Representatives. The skeletal House can continue its
business and its ability to do so will not depend on immediate replacement of
those members killed.
Moreover, the Foley-Gingrich proposal would not be permissible under the
Constitution. The power of the House of Representatives to "determine the
Rules of its Proceedings" cannot be read as enabling the House to empower
each individual member unilaterally to designate a successor, even a temporary
one. Each house controls or governs its operations and its business.96 But the
selection of even interim members has nothing to do with the body's
proceedings or operations, and rules of proceeding have nothing to do with the
means or manner of selecting Representatives who serve in the House.
In fact, the Constitution establishes two unequivocal means of choosing
House members, neither involving action by the House itself. Representatives
must be popularly elected by the voters of a district every two years, and
vacancies are filled by special elections before those same voters at a time and
place established by the state executive. 97 These are the exclusive methods of
choosing House members and neither the states nor Congress may create new
or additional mechanisms.98 While the House judges whether to seat individual
members, 99 nothing in the Constitution grants it the power to appoint a
different, more acceptable member to a seat if it rejects another's credentials or
qualifications. Instead, the seat remains vacant. The Constitution also makes
no provision for "acting" or "interim" members of the House.
B. Repopulating the Federal Government
The more important, but unaddressed, procedural issue is how to
repopulate the federal government. Imagine, in the most extreme example,
that no member of Congress or the cabinet survives; only numerous sub-
cabinet-level, inferior officers remain alive after the terrorist destruction of
Washington, D.C. The structural question will be what processes can and
96 See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 65, at 495.
97 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. I ("The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members
chosen.., by the People of the several States .... "); id. cl. 4 ("When vacancies happen in the Representation
from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.").
98 Cf. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 796 (1995) ("Congress may not alter or add to
the qualifications in the Constitution. ... ); id. at 837 (holding that the Constitution enumerates the
requirements for election to Congress and that the states lack the power to supplement those requirements).
99 See U.S. CONST. art. [, § 5, cl. I ("Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and
Qualifications of its own Members .... "); see also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 522, 550 (1969).
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should be followed to replace those killed from both political branches, and to
bring those branches back to full working capacity. This question properly
focuses on operative structural principles, recognizing that the federal
government consists of co-equal branches, each of which must be repopulated
in order to say truly that the federal government is continuing to perform its
governing functions in a constitutionally valid manner.
The current focus on a shadow government derived from remnants of the
current executive branch serves President Bush's political purposes of ensuring
the American people that there will be some federal government, that the
present Administration takes seriously the maintenance of the federal
government, and that it is doing something to protect and preserve the Union
from attack and tragedy. '°°  Thus the Administration's emphasis is on
continuing the existing government in skeletal, incomplete, and arguably
unconstitutional form, rather than on selecting replacement officials in all
branches through whom the federal government may recover from the attack.
This also reflects that the public is not concerned with legal niceties of
governmental legitimacy, but with keeping and maintaining some functioning
government in place, regardless (at least in the short term) of structure, form,
or personnel.'°'
The problem is that the federal government cannot repopulate itself, and its
role in repopulation will be limited. Repopulation depends instead on action
by the People and by the several states. The People elect new Senators and
Representatives.' °2 States appoint temporary Senators to fill vacancies until
those new elections. °3 States establish and control the time, place, and mannerfor holding congressional elections.'°'
tOO See Bush, supra note 7, at 317 ("1 have an obligation as the President... to the American people to...
put measures in place that should somebody be successful in attacking Washington, D.C., there's an ongoing
government.").
1o1 Cf Lawson & Seidman, supra note 9, at 25 (arguing that the People in 1788 were not focused on the
legal effect of ratification of the Constitution and whether it had created any rights, but "on the concrete
problems of putting together a functioning union").
102 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1; id. amend. XVII, cl. 1.
103 See id. amend. XVII, cl. 2.
104 See id art. I, § 4, cl. I ("The Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof."); Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510,
523 (2001) (stating that the "Elections Clause grants to the States 'broad power' to prescribe the procedural
mechanisms for holding congressional elections," in the form of a "grant of authority to issue procedural
regulations").
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This is, in fact, the "true genius of American federalism"'0 5 applied to
modem selection problems. Although the federal government would be the
likely target of a terrorist attack, that attack would not eliminate all sovereign
power within the nation. The several states continue to exist, each an
independent sovereign with inherent and inviolate powers that do not depend
for their existence or exercise on the federal government.' 6  These powers
include keeping the peace through control of state and local police forces and
the National Guard 0 7 and maintaining state-controlled infrastructure. These
powers also include appointing temporary Senators and controlling the election
of new members of both houses, all without any help or control from the
federal government.' States are significant in the constitutional order not
because they are exempt from federal anti-discrimination laws.' °9 States are
significant because they are the entities that guarantee and ensure continuity
and reestablishment of the federal government in the aftermath of the attack.
Indeed, the theory underlying the Constitution is that the federal government
105 DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 140 (1995) (describing the "true genius of American
federalism" as the opportunity for continued discussion and change of power allocation). See also Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 676, 708 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I would revert to
basic constitutional concepts that until recent times have been recognized and respected as the fundamental
genius of our federal system, namely the acceptance of wide state autonomy in local affairs."); Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 48 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("To impose uniform national requirements when
alternatives are constitutionally permissible would destroy that opportunity for broad experimentation which is
the genius of our federal system.").
'06 See Steven G. Gey, The Myth of State Sovereignty, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1601, 1631 (2002) ("[A]
government entity can only be deemed 'sovereign' (in the sense of immediate, rather than ultimate
sovereignty) if that government's power to adopt policies in a given area is exclusive, if those policies are
final, and if the government has the authority to enforce the policies... 'with evil or pain [or] through fear of
that evil."').
One way in which the terrorist-attack scenario differs from the former Cold War scenario is the survival
and continued existence of state governments. The Soviet attack, presumably, would have targeted the nation
as a whole on such a massive scale as to destroy all infrastructure at all levels. A terrorist attack or series of
attacks likely would be narrower, targeted at the federal government (and Washington), but leaving other
levels of government infrastructure in functioning order.
The paradox is that a massive nuclear strike would have laid waste to the entire country, but the advance
warning might have allowed for the security of the president and other top officials in the federal government,
keeping the national government alive. The terrorist scenario leaves in place much of the infrastructure below
the federal government, but (due to the element of surprise) may destroy the top of the national government.
107 See Turley, supra note 61, at 21-22 (arguing that state militias were allowed to exist as a continual
balance of force between federal and state control).
108 See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 9, at II ("[T]he states could provide entirely for the election of
members of the new Congress without any help from the Confederation Congress."); see also Gey, supra note
106, at 39 ("[I]f one governmental entity has sovereignty, then by definition the other does not.").
109 See Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garret, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (holding that states are immune
from private civil suits for monetary damages under Americans with Disabilities Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (same as to Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
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exists because the People, working through the states and state-controlled
procedures, choose the highest members of the political branches of
government.110
We return to a constitutional state of nature, reflecting the period of 1788-
1789. The Constitution became effective when New Hampshire became the
ninth state to ratify, on June 21, 1788,"' and eleven states had ratified by
August.' 2 The First Congress, representing eleven states, was seated in March
1789, eight months later."' Presidential electors chose George Washington as
President and John Adams as Vice President in February 1789, and both were
sworn-in by April.' 14
But nothing about the Constitution or the selection of federal office holders
was self-executing.' 5 Between August 1788 and March 1789, a "Congress and
a President had to be selected" and the "machinery of governance had to be put
in place in order for the new national government to function."" 6 That eight-
month interim was controlled almost entirely by the states. The lone national
action was a law passed by the Continental Congress, providing that electors
were to be appointed in the several states by the first Wednesday in January
1789, that electors were to meet on the first Wednesday in February, and that
the new Congress would commence proceedings on the first Wednesday in
March."' The states did the rest, controlling election or selection procedures
for original members of the House, Senate, and Electoral College.' And they
11o See THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 259 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[Each of the
principal branches of the federal government will owe its existence more or less to the favor of the State
governments."); id. No. 49, at 281-82 (James Madison) (describing the People as the legitimate source of
sovereignty under the Constitution); see also Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political
Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 254 (2000) (discussing arguments at the Constitutional
Convention that noted the role of the states in creating and selecting the federal government, thus making the
states necessary for the very existence of the federal government, and ensuring that the federal government
would not endanger those entities on which it depends for its very existence); Lawson & Seidman, supra note
9, at II (stating that there were certain actions in establishing the federal government that the states could
complete entirely on their own); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 546 (1954)
(arguing that states are the crucial instruments of federal selection).
111 See U.S. CONST. art. VII; Lawson & Seidman, supra note 9, at 5.
112 See BOWEN, supra note 86, at 306.
10 See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 9, at 6.
114 See KURODA, supra note 14, at 38; 2 THORPE, supra note 77, at 177-79.
115 See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 9, at 5.
116 Id. at 5, 8.
117 See CURRIE, supra note 77, at 3; KURODA, supra note 14, at 28; Lawson & Seidman, supra note 9, at
6, 11.
118 See KURODA, supra note 14, at 28-38 (describing efforts and processes in various states to select
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did it in a far more contested political climate, battling intra-state
disagreements about the best procedure for selecting presidential electors and
Senators,"' disagreements about whether Representatives should be chosen by
districts or at large,' 20 and general public apathy about the electoral process and
the wisdom of establishing a federal government.1
21
In the wake of a massive terrorist attack, the states again must fill two
distinct legislative bodies and choose a president, through temporary
appointments, direct elections, and selection of presidential electors. It is true
that there would be more going on in the nation and the world than in 1788-
the aftershocks of a massive, possibly nuclear, attack on the lone world super-
power; large numbers of dead and injured; the painful and costly process of
maintaining order, cleaning up, and recovering from the tragedy; a panic-
stricken populace simultaneously in mourning and desiring revenge; and a
standing military hierarchy equally eager to retaliate. '22 Popular elections are
not easily carried out under such conditions.
On the other hand, states will not have to overcome either public apathy or
disagreement about whether to populate the federal government or about
whether the federal government is a good idea. It is safe to assume that no
state today would engage in delays or abstentions in selecting new
representation in the reconstructed federal government. Rather, we can expect
the governor of a given state to act to fill Senate vacancies, call elections to fill
House vacancies, and to ensure the proper continuity of the national
government and of that state's representation in the national government. The
point, however, is that the primary locus of repopulation plans and efforts must
reside in the several states.
presidential electors and representatives for Congress); 2 THORPE, supra note 77, at 176-77; Lawson &
Seidman, supra note 9, at 5.
119 See, e.g., KURODA, supra note 14, at 28-29 (discussing disagreements in New Hampshire); id. at 35-36
(discussing New Jersey and Delaware); id. at 34-35 (discussing Virginia).
120 See id. at 29-30 (discussing disagreement in Massachusetts over whether to choose members of the
House of Representatives at large or in districts).
121 See id. at 36-37 (discussing unsuccessful Federalist attempts to stir interest in the elections in
Pennsylvania and the report in one county that "no supervisors for the election attended and the people were
indifferent to the occasion").
122 See Turley, supra note 61, at 7 ("The modem military is a massive organization that has taken on a




III. CHANGING THE LAW TO ACCOMMODATE CONTINGENCIES
The problem with the President's continuity-in-government plan (besides
the fact that no one outside the Administration really knows its content) lies
not necessarily with the plan itself. Shadow government is effective in
avoiding the most catastrophic scenario by ensuring that some presidential
successor and some portion of the executive branch is secure at all times and
will survive a terrorist attack. The problem is the way in which the plan fits (or
does not fit) with constitutional requirements for selecting members of the
executive and legislative branches, the meaning of the Succession Clause, and
general structural principles of separation of powers, democracy, and political
partisanship."'
It often is necessary to rework the overarching structure in order to
accommodate previously unanticipated contingencies. In fact, a key purpose
of the Article V constitutional amendment process is to address situations
where experience suggests that existing procedures do not operate effectively
or properly in light of developments and circumstances that the Framers did
not or could not foresee.' 24
The best prior illustration of this point is the Twelfth Amendment. The
original Electoral College scheme called for each elector to cast two votes for
president, with the top vote recipient becoming president and the runner-up
becoming vice president."' This scheme assumed there would be no party
system and that the two most qualified candidates together would form the
executive branch. 26 However, political parties quickly developed under the
new Constitution, bringing with them the practice of informally designating
one candidate as the choice for president and one as the choice for vice
president and instructing electors to vote accordingly. 2
123 See Wasserman, supra note 1, at 347-51 (describing structural principles and their role in devising and
operating governmental selection procedures).
124 THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 246 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossitered., 1961) ("T'hat useful alterations
will be suggested by experience could not but be foreseen."); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Constancy:
Why Congress Should Cure Itself of Amendment Fever, 17 CARDozo L. REV. 691, 692-93 (1996) (arguing that
only two constitutional amendments have "worked significant structural changes in the original constitutional
framework").
125 U.S. CONST. art. I1, § I, cl. 3. See KURODA, supra note 14, at 172; Sanford Levinson & Ernest A.
Young, Who's Afraid of the Twelfth Amendment?, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 925, 928 (2001).
126 See KURODA, supra note 14, at 27; Levinson & Young, supra note 125, at 928.
127 See KURODA, supra note 14, at 129.
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The pre-Twelfth Amendment system prevented parties from filling both
offices with their chosen candidates under ordinary procedures in both 1796
and 1800. The election of 1796 produced a divided executive-Federalist
President John Adams and Republican Vice President Thomas Jefferson-
because Federalist electors withheld votes from the party's vice presidential
favorite in order to avoid a tie. 28 The election of 1800 produced a tie between
the top two Republican vote recipients, a contingency election in the House of
Representatives, and very nearly an inversion of candidates-vice presidential
choice Aaron Burr as president instead of the party's presidential choice,
Thomas Jefferson." 9 It also produced "a fiasco that threatened to become afull-fledged constitutional crisis."'3 °
The Twelfth Amendment followed, establishing separate candidates,
ballots, and votes for each executive office, eliminating the risk of an inversion
of candidates, and significantly decreasing the risk of a split executive.' The
Amendment brought formal constitutional selection mechanisms in line with
informal party practices by making those party practices the constitutional
norm. That is, Congress recognized a deficiency in constitutional procedures
in connection with a particular development (the rise of political parties) and it
adjusted procedures to conform to and function within that new development.
The Framers similarly never imagined the possibility that every top-level
official in both political branches could be killed in a single attack or series of
coordinated attacks. The solution, however, is not President Bush's unilateral
continuity plans that assume an executive branch moving forward without a
legislative branch or an acting president at its head. Nor is the solution for
members of Congress to arrogate to themselves baseless powers to appoint
temporary replacements, as Foley and Gingrich propose. 32  To the extent
current structures are unable to handle the mass-destruction scenario that some
believe possible after September 11, the solution must incorporate
constitutional amendments and revised statutory schemes that allow for valid
succession and continuity.
128 See id. at 65-71; Akhil Reed Amar & Vik Amar, President Quayle?, 78 VA. L. REV. 913, 921 (1992);
Levinson & Young, supra note 125, at 928.
129 KURODA, supra note 14, at 99; Amar & Amar, supra note 128, at 922; Levinson & Young, supra note
125, at 929.
130 Levinson & Young, supra note 125, at 928.
131 See U.S. CONST. amend. XII; see also Amar & Amar, supra note 128, at 922-23.
132 See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
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Presidential succession and continuity-in-government plans arise in high-
stakes circumstances, suggesting the need to make specific changes to
succession provisions rather than risking a national crisis should a mass attack
on, and destruction of, the highest levels of the federal government actually
occur. Again, while the People will not focus on legal and constitutional
technicalities, any continuity scheme, particularly with regard to presidential
succession, should produce a government and government officials who are
unquestionably legitimate and constitutional.33
A. Constitutional Amendment
1. Temporary House Appointments
The Constitution should be amended to allow states to make temporary
appointments to fill vacancies in House seats, just as they make temporary
appointments to fill Senate vacancies.134 The amendment would authorize the
legislature of each state to empower the governor to make the appointment and
for the appointee to serve until writs of election are issued and a new
representative can be elected.
Foley and Gingrich are correct that generally long delays in holding special
congressional elections create problems under the mass-destruction scenario,
necessitating such short-term appointments."' The exigencies of a mass
destruction might speed the election process, as states push forward in
recognition of the unique emergency, with or without guidance from Congress.
We also could expect state and local officials, already well-known in their
districts, to step up and stand for election. On the other hand, an election
might be difficult in the post-attack climate; temporary appointments, which
can be made in a matter of days with state and local officials willing to step
into the breach, become the best option for repopulating both legislative houses
as quickly and easily as possible.
133 See Amar & Amar, supra note 10, at 139; see also Manning, supra note 30, at 153 ("[A] law for times
of exigency should be free of doubt.").134 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, cl. 2 ("When vacancies happen in the representation of any State
in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided,
That the legislature of iny State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the
people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct."), with id. art. 1, § 2, cl. 4 ("When vacancies
happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to
fill such Vacancies.").
135 Foley & Gingrich, supra note 8.
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Temporary House appointments remain necessary even if there can be a
quorum and selection of a new Speaker by the skeletal House. 3 6  The
Constitution must handle the most extreme situation-the death of every single
member of the House, which obviously eliminates any chance at a quorum. In
the extreme, states could appoint representatives to an entirely new House,
who then form a quorum and choose a Speaker, who then could resign her
House seat and act as president, if necessary. Moreover, even if a quorum is
possible with a majority of 101 surviving House members, this amendment
would help avoid long periods with a small, skeletal House of Representatives
that may not include representation for all states. Temporary appointments,
which bring the House to full capacity, meet that need.
Foley and Gingrich want to give the appointment power to the current
occupant of each House seat, rather than to the governor acting on the
authority of the state legislature. They argue that it is more democratic to have
the elected representative determine her own temporary successor, that it
grants the successor a type of apostolic legitimacy, having been hand-picked
by the popularly elected Representative. 37 The governor's statewide electoral
constituency may be significantly different than the more local constituency of
a House member from one part of the state."' The result might be an appointee
very different from the type of candidate who would be elected from that
district. Further, Foley and Gingrich suggest that it is more consistent with
political partisanship concerns, as it ensures that a Democrat will designate a
Democratic successor, whereas a Republican governor might appoint a
Republican successor to a seat formerly held by a Democratic representative. 9
Both democracy and political partisanship are vital structural con-
siderations in establishing and operating selection procedures. But one
reason that President Truman and Congress placed elected legislative officers,
rather than appointed cabinet officers, at the head of the succession order when
§ 19 was amended in 1947 was the belief that it was undemocratic to appoint
one's own contingent successor.' 4' Actually, the president does appoint her
contingent successor in two situations-in choosing a vice presidential running
136 See supra notes 74-99 and accompanying text.
137 See Foley & Gingrich, supra note 8.
138 See Fitzgerald, supra note 66, at 749 (describing the "more polyglot character" of the statewide
electoral constituency).
139 See Foley & Gingrich, supra note 8.
140 See Wasserman, supra note 1, at 348-51.
141 See Truman, supra note 37, at 129; see also Wasserman, supra note 1, at 356, 407 (describing
Truman's arguments in favor of legislative succession to the presidency).
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mate and in appointing a new vice president to fill a vacancy in that officeI, / 142
under the Twenty-fifth Amendment. Importantly, however, neither appoint-
ment is unilateral. An appointee to a vacant vice presidency must be con-
firmed by a majority of both houses of Congress. 4 And a candidate for vice
president stands before the electorate as part of the presidential candidate's
' 44
ticket. Voters cannot cast a separate vote for vice president, and it is unlikely
that the vice presidential candidate's presence will affect the decision to vote
for the presidential candidate at the head of the ticket. 45 Nevertheless, the vice
president still stands before the national electorate for some consideration.
By contrast, having the holder of a federal congressional seat, once elected,
unilaterally tap a contingent successor to her seat is entirely novel. There is no
hint of popular consideration of that successor or her qualifications. And there
is no hint of popular accountability for the selection of that successor; the
People cannot do much to hold a deceased member of Congress accountable
for her choice. A president could, in theory, be held to account for a poor vice
presidential choice. Similarly, a governor remains accountable if an appointee
to a House vacancy proves unpopular. This accountability also reduces the
risk of blatant partisanship in House appointments. A Democratic governor
who, in the wake of a terrorist attack, appoints ten Democrats to replace an
evenly split House delegation might pay a political price.
Temporary House appointments likely have been considered unnecessary,
given the relatively short two-year term of office; by the time a temporary
appointee is in place and writs of election have been issued, the regular
biennial election has arrived. This perhaps explains why the Seventeenth
Amendment, in providing for popular election of Senators and temporary
appointments until an election could be held, did not provide for similar
appointments in the House. The mass-destruction scenario, with simultaneous
vacancies in so many seats, alters the analysis, making temporary appoint-
ments vital both to ensure a quorum to do business and a close-to-full, more
142 See Wasserman, supra note 1, at 407-08 (describing two situations in which the president appoints the
vice president, who is the immediate constitutional successor).
143 U.S. CONST. amend XXV, § 2.
144 See Amar & Amar, supra note 128, at 925-26 (describing state election laws under which names of the
presidential and vice presidential candidates of one party are listed as a single party ticket on the ballot); id. at
913 (noting the inability of voters to split the executive ballot).
145 See id. at 926; see also id. at 916 (stating that in 1988, many voters would have preferred to vote for an
executive branch of Republican presidential candidate George H.W. Bush and Democratic vice presidential
candidate Lloyd Bentsen).
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representative House during the interim between the tragedy and any special
election.
2. Clarify the Meaning of the Word "Officer" in the Succession Clause
The Succession Clause of Article II, section 1 should be amended to make
clear that legislative officers are constitutionally eligible statutory successors,
that the Speaker and the President Pro Tempore are legislative officers,
differently situated from rank-and-file legislators, and that they are officers
• 146
constitutionally eligible to act as president. Doing so removes any doubt as
to the constitutionality of the Speaker or President Pro Tempore acting as
president. This change is necessary because, while neither legislative officer
should be at the head of the line of succession, the Constitution must account
for every member of the cabinet being killed in the terrorist attack. The
executive power must devolve to legislative officers in that situation; the
Constitution clearly should provide that such limited legislative succession is
valid.
But the Succession Clause still should be limited to "officers"-meaning
cabinet members, the Speaker, and the President Pro Tempore-and no one
else. The line of succession should extend no further, given the strong
democratic and practical arguments that preclude placing rank-and-file




The Quorum Clause should be amended to make clear that it is permissible
for either house to establish as the quorum denominator the number of seats
currently occupied by living members, rather than total number of authorized
seats, as an emergency measure.148 This guarantees that the'skeletal 101-person
House and 21-person Senate can continue to perform legislative functions until
vacant seats can be filled, whether by appointment or election.
B. Statutory Changes
The mass-destruction scenario provides an incentive for Congress and the
president to make several necessary changes to the statutory succession
146 See Manning, supra note 30, at 143; see also supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text,
147 See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
148 See infra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
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process. Such changes bring § 19 in line with the amended constitutional text
and structural principles and enable the statutory scheme better to handle a
worst-case scenario.
1. Change the Statutory Succession Order
The first and most important change is to the enumerated succession order.
The executive power should devolve into the cabinet first, beginning with the
Secretary of State and proceeding according to age of department.149 The
Speaker and President Pro Tempore should remain in the line of succession,
but at the end, assuming the executive power only in the event of total
destruction of the executive branch. This is a statutory concession to the mass-
destruction exigency. While previous arguments had urged removing
legislators from the succession line altogether,' 50 the new scenario assumes the
possibility of the destruction of the entire cabinet. The line of succession must




Second, Congress should eliminate the supplantation provision, under
which a prior-entitled statutory successor may supplant a lower statutory
officer who already has been sworn-in as acting president.'5 2 The provision
does little more than bring about confusion and in-fighting among statutory
153
successors.
The only situation in which some form of supplantation remains necessary
is where the president has been killed, the vice president temporarily disabled,
and the Secretary of State has become acting president. Once the vice
president no longer is disabled, she assumes the executive power from the
Secretary. However, no statutory provision is needed to accommodate this
situation. Because the president is dead, the vice president becomes
president; '54 the Secretary of State has become acting president only because
149 See Amar & Amar, supra note 10, at 135-38; Calabresi, supra note 13, at 156; Wasserman, supra note
1, at 409.
15o See Wasserman, supra note 1, at 409; supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
151 See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
152 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(2) (2000).
153 See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
154 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § I ("In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death or
resignation, the Vice President shall become President.").
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the vice president is disabled. As a constitutional matter, the Secretary acts as
president only until the vice president's "Disability be removed. '  Thus, once
the vice president (now the president) is no longer disabled, she is
constitutionally mandated to resume the presidency; any statutory declaration
of that fact is superfluous. Beyond this situation, once any § 19 statutory
successor has been sworn-in as acting president, she should remain in that
position until the selection of a new president.
5 6
3. Special Presidential Election
Third, Congress should amend § 19 to provide for a special election to
select a new president and vice president as quickly as possible whenever
anyone below the vice president assumes the presidency. 5 7 This election will
produce a president (as opposed to an acting president), meaning it must be
conducted as any ordinary presidential election, with executive officers chosen
by presidential electors selected according to mechanisms established in each
state. 1 8 All states have decided on popular election as the means of choosing
those electors,'59 although each state does remain free to utilize a different
procedure for choosing electors for the special presidential election. 6
0
Assuming that most states recognize the democratic import of popularly
selecting electors,' 6' the special election will operate as fifty-one simultaneous
state-controlled popular votes for presidential electors.
115 Id. art. II, § I, cl. 6 ("[S]uch Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed ...."). See
also Amar & Amar, supra note 10, at 135-36.
156 See Amar & Amar, supra note 10, at 135 (arguing that the Constitution does not permit a statute under
which some officer acts as president until some other enumerated officer (other than the vice president) wants
the job).
157 See id. at 138; Calabresi, supra note 13, at 174; Wasserman, supra note 1, at 409-10.
158 U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 1, cl. 2-3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98,
104 (2000) (per curiam).
159 See Bush, 531 U.S. at 104 ("History has now favored the voter, and in each of the several States, the
citizens themselves vote for Presidential electors."): Wasserman, supra note 1, at 396 ("All of the states have
adopted... popular election as the means of choosing presidential electors[.]").
160 See U.S. Const. art. 11, § 1, cl. 2 ("Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof
may direct, a Number of Electors .... ); Bush, 531 U.S. at 104 (noting that the state can take back the power
to appoint electors at any time); Wasserman, supra note 1, at 400 ("The Constitution gives the states plenary
power to determine the manner of appointing electors and nothing suggests any limitation on that power
...."). But see Peter M. Shane, Disappearing Democracy: How Bush v. Gore Undermined the Federal Right
to Vote for Presidential Electors, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 535, 549 (2001) ("It is unthinkable, against this
history of constitutional development, that a state legislature should still be deemed authorized to usurp the
people's role in choosing presidential electors.").
161 See Wasserman, supra note 1, at 396-97 (arguing that the prevalence of popular selection of electors
has made the president a more democratic officer); see also Shane, supra note 160, at 539 ("[T]he Fourteenth
Amendment, persuasively read, does guarantee individual citizens the right to vote for presidential electors.").
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
The special presidential election is vital because the annihilation of the top
levels of the federal government shakes the federal system to its foundations.
Effective continuity in the executive branch in the long term demands a
president, rather than an acting president. There is a symbolic benefit to
having a president at the head of the executive branch in time of crisis, both for
the office holder and the People. 61 Moreover, the special election places the
direct popular imprimatur of the national electoral constituency on the new
occupant of the White House as she begins the process of leading the federal
government and the nation back from tragedy. 163
In addition, the speedy special election obviates the need for supplantation
among statutory successors. While the Secretary of State is a more preferable
successor than the Secretary of Veterans' Affairs or the Speaker of the House,
the special election means that any statutory successor, no matter how high or
low on the list, will act only for a matter of months. It is not worth the
uncertainty (and the potential for manipulation and abuse)'64 in a time of crisis
to have cabinet officers fighting amongst themselves over who properly should
be acting as president. A special election makes it easier for Congress to
eliminate supplantation.
The acting president, whether elevated from the cabinet or Congress,
should help restore order, provide emergency relief, and keep the peace in the
immediate aftermath of the tragedy, then give way to a duly elected president,
who will serve the remainder of the extant four-year term. That election can
and should occur within six or seven months, if not sooner. 16  The president
chosen in the special election will serve only the remainder of the unexpired
term and the next regular quadrennial presidential election should occur on
162 See Wasserman, supra note 1, at 410-12 (describing benefits of electing a president as quickly as
possible, including the symbolic benefit of removing the word "acting" from in front of the title).
163 See id. at 412; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Presidents Without Mandates (With Special Emphasis on
Ohio), 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 375, 384 (1999) (emphasizing the need for "a strong mandate from the American
people" and "a leader who does have such a mandate to hold the nation's (and today, the world's) most
powerful office").
164 See Cinquegrana, supra note 56, at 139 ("The looming omnipresence of a congressional power to
supplant an Acting President would so clearly prevent the uninhibited performance of those functions as to
require no further elaboration."); id. at 117-19 (describing elaborate hypothetical in which the Speaker uses the
underlying threat of supplantation to compel the acting president to appoint an independent counsel to
investigate cabinet officers); Wasserman, supra note 1, at 366-67 (describing possible manipulation of
supplantation power and resulting loss of executive independence); see also supra notes 55-56 and
accompanying text.
165 See Amar & Amar, supra note 10, at 138 n.144 (arguing that allowing time for grieving and
campaigning would mean that a special election could not be held for six or seven months); Calabresi, supra
note 13, at 174 (arguing for special election within 60 days).
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schedule.' 66 If the mass-destruction occurs during a presidential election year,no special election is necessary, and the scheduled election should proceed.
4. Special Congressional Elections
Fourth, Congress should require that any Senate seat recently filled by
appointment be contested in an immediate special election, whenever some
certain number of Senate seats (for example, when one-fifth of the Senate, or
twenty seats) are filled by recent appointees. Although the power to issue
writs of election to fill Senate seats rests with the state, 67 Congress may by law
establish uniform rules for national elections.
68
An appointed Senator, like an acting president, should not serve all or a
substantial portion of a lengthy term; democracy demands a duly elected
legislator in office as quickly as possible. Senate appointees ordinarily serve
only until the next statewide election, usually held within two years. But if
every state will be conducting a special presidential election within six months
of the attack, it makes sense to select permanent Senators during the same
procedure.16  This again limits the amount of time in which an elective officeis occupied by an unelected official.
House seats, having been filled by state appointees, also could be contested
at this election, although there perhaps is less need to elect new House
members at this point, since each House seat will be up for election within two
years in any event. Imagine the following-the mass terrorist attack occurred
six months into a new Congress, the appointee was placed in the seat within
one week, and the special election occurred six months later, approximately
one year into a two-year term. That seat will be contested again in a regular
election less than one year later. This contrasts with an acting president, who
may serve as long as three more years or an appointed Senator, who may serve
as long as five more years. There are fewer democratic problems with an
166 See Wasserman, supra note 1, at 410 (arguing that the democratic and partisan flow to the pattern of
presidential and congressional elections, in which the President, all of the House, and one-third of the Senate
stand for election together every four years, should remain in place even after the special presidential election).
In a similar fashion, a vice president who becomes president remains president only for the remainder of the
ongoing term, rather than beginning a new four-year term. See Amar & Amar, supra note 10, at 138 n.144.
167 See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, cl. 2; id. art. I, § 4. cl. I ("The Times, Places and Manners of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof . .
168 See id. art. I, § 4, cl. I ("Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations .... ").
169 The congressional election should occur even if there is no need to select a President, as where the vice
president was in the bunker and survived the terrorist attack. Democratic concerns still demand elected
Senators as quickly as possible, at least where some critical mass of Senate members are appointees.
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appointed House member serving out the brief remainder of the term for the
seat to which she was appointed.
5. Special Small Quorum Rules
Fifth, each house of Congress should promulgate, pursuant to the power to
establish its own rules of proceeding, a special quorum rule that clearly defines
a quorum as a majority of the number of seats presently occupied by sworn
living members. This rule ensures that, in the hours and days following any
mass destruction, Congress can assemble and continue its operations in a
constitutionally consistent and proper manner, thereby enabling the federal
government as a whole to continue its operations in a constitutionally
consistent and proper manner. This will be an emergency rule, applicable only
in the event of a mass catastrophic attack that kills a large number of members
of Congress, a determination made by each house of Congress.
The fact that this quorum might be small-not much larger than the
quorum of thirty out of fifty-nine House members with which Congress began
in 1789'7-perhaps is problematic. There were objections at the Con-
stitutional Convention to the small size of the House of Representatives, a fear
that a small legislative body is a poor depositary of the public interest, lacking
necessary knowledge of constituents' interests.' Similar doubts might arise
with the post-attack skeleton House. Having the House of Representatives-
the department of the federal government closest to and most dependent on the
People '-shrink from 435 to 101 members (with some states perhaps lacking
any representation) and continuing to act as a national legislative body with a
quorum of just fifty-one, raises doubts about the broader democratic legitimacy
of its actions.' There also could be some limit as to how low this special
quorum could go-the two Senators from North Dakota and the one House
170 North Carolina, which had five seats, and Rhode Island, which had one seat, had not yet ratified the
Constitution at the time the House began operations in April 1789.
171 See THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 309 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); id. at 312 ("[T]he
liberties of America cannot be unsafe in the number of hands proposed by the federal Constitution."); id. No.
56, at 314 (James Madison) (addressing charge that House would "be too small to possess a due knowledge of
the interests of its constituents").
172 See THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 295 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[l]t is particularly
essential that the [House of Representatives] should have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate
sympathy with, the people.").
173 See Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure 32-33 (2003) (unpublished
manuscript on file with the author) (describing as one arguable cost of legislative absence "the loss of
legitimacy said to result when the legislature proceeds without a full complement or even majority
participation").
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member from Delaware arguably should not alone be enough to engage in
valid legislative activity.
The small size of this quorum is the product of the extreme emergency and
should be only temporary, lasting until vacancies can be filled by the several
states through immediate appointments and by the People through state-
controlled elections. As Madison argued at the beginning, it cannot be thought
that "the smallness of the number, as a temporary regulation, be dangerous to
the public liberty[.]'1 4 And assuming speedy appointments by state governors,
the skeletal Congress will be acting only for a few days before the membership
of each house is brought up to full working capacity.
One perhaps could argue that appointing new members to both houses
obviates the need for a special quorum; assuming sufficient appointments can
be made within a matter of days, each house can reestablish a full quorum,
leaving Congress unable to assemble and conduct business only for a short
period. This assumes, however, that some valid form of the executive branch
remains in place to manage the situation and carry out existing law, even if no
new legislation or appropriations will be forthcoming in that first week. This,
in turn, assumes that some eligible statutory presidential successor survived the
attack and validly holds the executive power under the Constitution. But if
none of the prior enumerated officers survives, the skeletal Congress must
have the ability to act immediately to select a new Speaker, who in turn will
become acting president. ' Congress cannot be made to wait even a week to
allow for sufficient state appointments, because no one would be in place to
assume the executive power in the meantime.
6. Arrange for Assembly Awayfrom the Seat of Government
A final consideration is where the shadow government, in whatever form,
will meet, assuming that Washington, D.C. has been destroyed or rendered
uninhabitable by a terrorist attack. All government activity must occur in
Washington, "the seat of government . . . and not elsewhere, except as
otherwise expressly provided by law.' 76  Congress has empowered the
president to convene Congress and to conduct other government operations
elsewhere in case of the prevalence of a contagious disease or sickness at the
174 See THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 311-12 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis
added).
175 See supra notes 68-91 and accompanying text.
176 4 U.S.C. § 72 (2000).
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seat of government or, in the case of Congress, "other circumstances . . .
hazardous to the lives or health of the members."'77 The provisions with regard
to the rest of the federal government should also include "other hazardous
circumstances" language, so both political branches of the government can be
relocated to a safe, habitable location from which to conduct business.1
C. Respective Roles of Federal and State Governments
The last consideration for repopulation of the federal government is the
respective balance of power between the state and federal governments. The
primary locus of repopulation activity will be the several states.' 79  States
control the means of appointing members to both the House and Senate,
including the identity of those temporary appointees. States control the special
elections for the House and Senate and the process for choosing presidential
electors, whether the legislature retains for itself the power to appoint electors
or provides for selection by special popular election. States execute these
selection processes without guidance or control from the federal government.
The federal government's role will be limited to establishing more specific,
uniform requirements to guide states in the repopulation efforts. Congress
should demand, for example, that each state provide for temporary
appointments within seven to fourteen days. Perhaps Congress could require
each governor to prepare an advance list of possible appointees for each seat in
its congressional delegation, probably from among state and local officers
willing to agree to accept that appointment in the emergency. This advance list
of potential appointees also restores some popular accountability. Assuming
the list becomes public, the People perhaps could take a governor to task in
advance if the proposed appointees are unpopular or unqualified.
177 Id. § 73 ("In case of the prevalence of a contagious or epidemic disease at the seat of government, the
President may permit and direct the removal of any or all the public offices to such other place or places as he
shall deem most safe and convenient for conducting the public business."); 2 U.S.C. § 27 (2000) ("Whenever
Congress is about to convene, and from the prevalence of contagious sickness, or the existence of other
circumstances, it would, in the opinion of the President, be hazardous to the lives or health of the members to
meet at the seat of Government, the President is authorized, by proclamation, to convene Congress at such
other place as he may judge proper.").
178 A relatively minor point such as the place of seat of government in the event of the anticipated
emergency illustrates the import of an open and more comprehensive approach to the question of continuity in
government, an approach that considers all contingencies and all branches of the federal government; this
contrasts with the apparently narrow and unilateral approach taken by the Bush Administration. See supra
note 8 and accompanying text.
179 See supra notes 100-22 and accompanying text.
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The federal government can also establish some more specific, uniform
requirements as to when expedited special elections should take place and how
they should be carried out."O Congress could require states to prepare detailed
contingency blueprints for a quick cold start to the state election machinery. It
should demand, for example, that all special presidential or congressional
elections occur and all presidential electors be chosen within six months of the
catastrophic event. Finally, Congress's main function will be to determine the
time and manner in which the electors, once chosen via state-controlled
procedures, cast votes for the new president and vice president and the time
and manner in which those votes will be counted and recorded.
8
D. Continuity and Repopulation in Practice
With the suggested constitutional and statutory changes in place, how
would succession and continuity work in the wake of a massive terrorist attack
that took out the top levels of the federal government?
First consider presidential succession. If the vice president survives, she
becomes president and appoints a new vice president. If the vice president
does not survive and a cabinet officer does, she becomes and remains acting
president; a surviving Speaker or President Pro Tempore remains in Congress.
If no cabinet officer survives, the executive power devolves (properly, thanks
to the constitutional amendment) to the Speaker or to the President Pro
Tempore.
In a more extreme example-the president, vice president, the entire
cabinet, the Speaker, and the President Pro Tempore all killed, 101 House
members and 21 Senators remain-succession works as follows: The skeleton
Congress selects a new Speaker and a new President Pro Tempore; each house
has a quorum to do this under its emergency rule utilizing living members in
occupied seats as the denominator. The new Speaker resigns her seat and the
Speakership and becomes acting president. The House, now 100 members
180 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. I (providing that Congress may make or alter regulations as to the time,
place, and manner for choosing Representatives and Senators); id. art. II, § I, cl. 4 ("The Congress may
determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall
be the same throughout the United States.").
'8' Cf. 3 U.S.C. § 7 (2000) (providing date on which electors meet for ordinary presidential election); id.
§ 8 (providing that electors vote "in the manner directed by the Constitution"); id. § 9 (establishing
certification procedures after elector votes); id. §§ 9-12 (providing for certification and reporting of results of




strong, selects a new Speaker. The acting president appoints a new cabinet and
begins fully exercising the executive power under the Constitution until the
special election.
As for congressional continuity, both houses continue operations under the
new, small-quorum rules. A majority in each-fifty-one in the House, eleven
in the Senate-enables Congress to continue as an effective legislative body.
Governors appoint temporary replacements to the vacant seats in both houses,
preferably within one to two weeks. Within a matter of weeks, each house
should be back at or close to capacity and with a true working quorum based
on a majority of possible members.
Within six months, a special election will occur for the Senate, perhaps the
House, and for presidential electors, if someone other than the vice president
has assumed the presidency.'82 This election will be the last phase of
continuity-in-government. When the election is over, a president and vice
president will be in office and both houses of Congress will be at full
capacities of 100 and 435 (with quorums of 51 and 218, respectively), with all
members popularly elected.
Finally, we consider the most extreme scenario-president, vice president,
entire cabinet, and all of Congress killed in the attack.'83 The real problem here
will be the delay and the power vacuum. The states must immediately, within
a matter of days, appoint new Representatives and Senators. Both houses will
assemble with these newly appointed members and choose a Speaker and
President Pro Tempore, respectively. The Speaker now is statutorily eligible to
act as president'84 once she resigns the Speakership and her House seat. The
acting president appoints cabinet officers to help her carry out the executive
power, most importantly in keeping the peace, beginning emergency relief
efforts, and planning any military retaliation. The House chooses a new
182 A special presidential election need occur only if the surviving successor is someone other than the
vice president. If the vice president survives the attack (because, for example, she was in the bunker at the
time of the attack), she becomes president (not acting president) and nominates a new vice president,
confirmed by both houses of Congress. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 2.
183 The primary benefit of having the vice president or one cabinet member in the secured location at all
times is that it prevents this scenario by guaranteeing the safety of one statutory presidential successor at all
times.
184 She must, of course, satisfy the constitutional requirements for the presidency-be a natural bom
citizen of the United States, thirty-five years of age, and fourteen years a resident of the United States. See
U.S. Const. art. 11, § 1, cl. 4. The newly-appointed members of the House must take care to ensure that the
new Speaker meets those requirements.
[Vol. 52
THE TROUBLE WITH SHADOW GOVERNMENT
Speaker, who remains as Speaker. Special elections for president and
Congress again are held within six months.
CONCLUSION
It is unlikely that the People are concerned with the constitutional and legal
niceties of any continuing government in the wake of a terrorist attack; the
public concern is that some federal government continues, through some
officials. One would hope, however, that those devising continuity procedures
would show greater concern for constitutional detail. It is not enough that
there be a continuing federal government. The goal should not be merely the
continuity of an executive branch comprised of random remnants.
More consistent succession, continuity, and repopulation plans are possible
under the current Constitution and laws, with several adjustments and
amendments suggested here. But rulemakers must think in constitutional
terms. The goal must be continuity of a federal government that is
constitutional and democratically legitimate, because all the political branches
exist and all have been filled according to proper procedures.
20031
326 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52
